Having dominated global trade since the Bretton Woods currency agreement at the end of World War II, the US dollar’s leading role started in the 1920s and has lasted well after.[1]

This is not another headline-grabbing prediction of the death of the US dollar as a reserve currency.

But what is a reserve currency?

A reserve currency is one that central banks hold as part of foreign exchange reserves to use as payment for imports, especially during economic shocks, and to moderate the swings in the value of their currency. The role of global reserve currency usually goes to a country with the most sophisticated, liquid currency and sovereign debt market.

The US Treasury market value exceeds $28 trillion, easily making it the largest. Europe's bond market includes supranational, sovereign, and agency bonds, totaling $12 trillion.2,3 The US advantage includes being at least twice the size of the next largest market, European bonds are not all issued by the same treasury as in the US, and Europe lacks a unified European bond market – these issues keep the euro from being a more serious challenger to the dollar.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does recognize eight reserve currencies: the Australian dollar, the British pound sterling, the Canadian dollar, the Chinese renminbi, the European Union euro, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, and the US dollar.4,5 However, the US dollar, making up 59% of global foreign exchange (FX) reserves, is the sole qualifier as a global reserve currency.

The US dollar's status as the leading reserve currency has been called an 'exorbitant privilege' of the US, allowing for cheap financing of US debt and exporting our values overseas via labor practices and human rights standards.6

Has the privilege been squandered?

When our major trading partners view our trade agreements akin to a ‘wheel of misfortune’ with ever-changing tariffs, we risk squandering the exorbitant privilege, however noble the goal of growing the middle class.

Squandering the privilege risks erasing what we receive in exchange for often one-sided trade agreements: the ability to finance cheaply, import deflation via foreign-made goods, and play a part in spreading US values overseas via commerce, not conflict.

Who is to blame for the squandering?

The behavior change started with President George W. Bush (2000–2009). It continued with Presidents Obama (2009–2017), Trump (2017–2021), Biden (2021–2025), and Trump (2025–Present) again, as all have used the US dollar's ubiquitous trading system as an arm of enforcement for US foreign policy:

  • Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, President Bush used the US dollar-based financial networks to choke off terrorist funding and pressure rogue states.7
  • In 2012, President Obama cut Iran from the US dollar settlement system to motivate action on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action known as the Iran nuclear agreement.8
  • Various presidents from 2005 to 2008 isolated North Korea by threatening any bank that transacted with them with disconnection from the US dollar system.9
  • Following the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea, Russian transactions were limited on the system.10
  • From 2017 to 2019, Venezuela was the target of financial sanctions, cutting Petróleos de Venezuela from some bond market activities.11
  • Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, several Russian banks were cut off from US dollar transactions.12

As a result, foreign nations resorted to buying gold to hold in their FX reserves so they could continue to pay for necessary imports even if they were cut out of the US dollar trading system for not following US foreign policy goals.

Regulation changes have provided inspiration

As a result of Basel III rules instituted after the global financial crisis, central banks were allowed to hold gold on their balance sheets at 100% of the market value, compared to only 50% of the market value previously.13,14 Thus, removing a significant penalty for central banks holding gold. The increase to full market value allowed central banks to buy more sovereign bonds in an emergency.

Gold's valuation on balance sheets has helped offset any need to hold Treasuries on the balance sheet via quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is when a central bank buys government bonds to increase the money supply and lower interest rates, both of which are stimulatory to the economy. There is plenty of debt to go around.

The US has issued a large amount of debt, growing the outstanding balances of US Treasuries by 755% since April 1, 1993. The price of gold, by comparison, has risen 855% over the same period.15

This caught our attention.

In the 20-year period between April 15, 2005, and April 15, 2025, the S&P 500 rose 597.43%, including dividend reinvestments.[16] The total outstanding of all public US treasuries rose 365%, and gold prices rose an astounding 660%.[17] To say it another way, it has been more valuable to own an alternative reserve currency to the US dollar than to own the largest US companies, which only raises further questions.

Do global reserve currencies change over time?

Global reserve currencies not only change, but actually change quite regularly:

  • The US dollar became the reserve currency in 1921, roughly when the British pound's term ended.18
  • The British pound’s role had lasted 105 years since roughly 1815, when it took over from the French franc.
  • The French franc ruled global transactions for 95 years, since 1720, when it took over from the Dutch gulden.
  • The Dutch gulden ruled for 80 years, starting in 1640 when it took over from Spain's real de a ocho.
  • The Spanish real de a ocho ruled global transactions for 110 years, since 1530 when it took over from the Portuguese escudo.

These nations and timeframes will be familiar to anyone who has read Graham Allison's 2018 book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?, which examines the recurring conflict between existing power nations and rising power nations, or the "Thucydides’ trap" Allison references in his title.

The pattern that emerges is that a currency's reign as the default denomination for global transactions nears an end when the country overextends itself, often militarily or via excessive debt, allowing a rising country to replace its role.

Further poking and prodding at the “Thucydides’ trap”

The US was not alone in debt expansion.

Central bank balance sheets have expanded virtually in unison. Since January 1, 1999, the US Federal Reserve balance sheet has grown by 1244%, the European Central Bank by 807%, the Bank of Japan by 981%, and the People’s Bank of China by 904%.19 All of these central banks bought their own country’s debt to lower rates, to preserve a FX rate sufficiently low to allow exports to remain competitive – all while the S&P 500 has grown by 811% and gold price has risen by 1056%.16,20

A history lesson in currency resets

Over the last 100 years, multiple currency resets have occurred:

  • The Genoa Economic and Financial Conference of 1922 reestablished the global monetary order after World War I, emphasizing the US dollar and UK pound.21
  • The 1945 Bretton Woods agreement created the World Bank and IMF established a series of fixed exchange rates after World War II to help facilitate reconstruction and cemented the US dollar as the global reserve currency.1,22
  • While not a formal agreement, President Nixon removed the US from the gold standard in 1971, ending foreigners' ability to exchange US dollars for gold at a fixed rate. The action ushered in the era of floating rates for many major currencies.23
  • The Jamaica Accords of 1976 allowed for a formal acceptance of a managed float of the exchange rates, which had been in effect since 1971. Also, compensation was allowed to developing countries for lost earnings from commodity exports.24
  • The Plaza Accord of 1985 addressed massive US trade deficits and dollar overvaluation, which made US exports uncompetitive.25
  • The Louvre Accord of 1987 was necessary to halt the decline of the US dollar as the Plaza Accord had been too successful.26
  • The launch of the Euro in 1999 was one of the most ambitious currency resets, monetary union across Europe without full fiscal union, which remains a tension point to this day.27
  • China's managed float and Special Drawing Right (SDR) inclusion in 2005 and 2016.28 In 2005, China depegged the Yuan from the US dollar and moved to a managed floating rate.29 In 2016, China was successful in lobbying the IMF to include the Yuan in the Special Drawing Rights basket, joining the US dollar, Japanese yen, euro, and UK pound.
  • COVID-era fiscal and monetary easing coordination 2020–2021. A large expansion of US dollar swap lines emphasized the importance of the US dollar in the global monetary system.30

Winds of currency change?

Historical precedent suggests a global reserve currency’s reign lasts 80–100 years. Even if we are not at the end of the US dollar’s current 100-year reign, we may be on the cusp of another major iteration in its reign. Nine major changes have occurred in the US dollar’s 100-year reign; we may just be witnessing the next one.

This potential may be starting to be reflected in gold prices.

Is gold a crowded trade?

ETF investors across the industry own 89 million ounces of gold and over the last five years, have owned between 80 million (June 2024) and 111 million ounces (October 2020).31 Since February 2025, they have added 6 million ounces. It is hard to call that crowded.

Money managers own 200,000 gold contracts and, over the last five years, have owned between 52,000 and 354,000 contracts.32 The number of contracts is roughly in the middle of the range over the last five years; it's also hard to call that crowded.

China and India are the two largest retail physical markets for gold, which is commonly given during festivals and weddings. Ownership levels are unavailable there, but price premium/discount information can indicate demand trends.

Gold is trading in Mumbai at a $64 discount to the London benchmark, reflecting India's propensity to hold off on purchases when prices rise.33

Despite higher prices, gold is trading in China at a $1 premium to the London benchmark, as investors favor its often-defensive nature going into 2025.

Central Bank purchase information reflects over 1,000 tons of net purchases each of the last three years, continuing into 2025. Eighteen tons were purchased in January, and 24 tons in February, within the range of similar months over the previous three years.34,35 The net purchases add to buying demand, pushing prices higher, and we would be more negative if we saw net sales.

Chinese insurance companies have recently been allowed to own gold, and four have joined the Shanghai Gold Exchange as members. There are early signs that some uptick in gold demand has come from this sector. Chinese retail investor demand for gold is viewed as fickle and easily changeable, but insurance company holdings would be longer-term based.

Despite a 27% return year to date, it isn't easy to spot an obvious overallocation to gold amongst investors.36

On the other hand, if we have a resolution on the tariff front, an obvious shift would be to focus on silver and industrial metals instead of gold.

Final thoughts

Ultimately, a free-floating currency, unconstrained capital markets, and democracy help governance mistakes self-adjust. The question for investors is whether we are in the world of President Jimmy Carter – characterized by low growth, high inflation, and multi-year-long stagflation – or the Reagan- Thatcher world of successful currency adjustments that set a growth path for the future after a bit of pain. Either outcome is a marked change from the situation entering this year. Over the decade of the 1970s, the Bloomberg Commodity Index’s total return rose 1390%, and from September 1985, when the Plaza Accord was signed, through the end of the 1980s, it rose 227%.[37] Finally, the gameplay for strategic advantage in global trade is ongoing. Still, whether the manufacturing company is located in Shenzhen, Ho Chi Minh City, Chennai, Rotterdam, or Cleveland, it will consume industrial metals, and shifting production from one country to another will be a commodity-intensive exercise.

1 Bretton Woods system was a post-World War II international monetary system that required countries to guarantee convertibility into US dollars within 1% of fixed parity rates. The US dollar was then convertible into gold at a rate of $35 per ounce of gold.
2 "Testimony on US Treasury Debt in the Monetary System." U.S. Treasury Debt in the Monetary System. SIFMA, April 2025. https://www.sifma.org/resources/submissions/testimony/testimony-on-us-treasury-debt-in-the-monetary-system/.
3 "Hedge funds shake up the euro zone's $10 trillion government bond market." Reuters, March 2024. https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/hedge-funds-shake-up-euro-zones-10-trillion-government-bond-market-2024-03-19/.
4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a global organization of 191 countries to foster monetary cooperation and financial stability, promote growth and reduce poverty.
5 Aberdeen, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), April 2025.
6 "The Dollar’s Exorbitant Privilege." CFA Institute Global Survey on the US Debt and the Role of the US Dollar. CFA Institute Research & Policy Center, October 2024. https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/sites/default/files/-/media/documents/survey/dollars-exorbitant-privilege-survey-report.pdf.
7 "Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing Executive Order." The White House, September 2001. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-2.html.
8 "Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran." The White House, July 2012. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/31/fact-sheet-sanctions-related-iran.
9 "Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act." U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 2005. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js2720.
10 “Sanctions to Curtail Russia’s Use of the International Financial System.” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, November 2024. https://ru.usembassy.gov/sanctions-to-curtail-russias-use-of-the-international-financial-system/.
11 ”Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy.” Congress.gov, March 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10715.
12 ”US cutting off Russia’s central bank from US dollar transactions.” CNN Politics, February 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/politics/sanctions-russia-putin-rainy-day-fund/index.html.
13 Basel III is a set of international banking regulations developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to enhance the resilience of the banking sector.
14 “Is Basel III setting up a new gold-backed monetary system?” Mining.com, April 2025. https://www.mining.com/is-basel-iii-setting-up-a-new-gold-backed-monetary-system/.
15 Bloomberg, US treasury outstanding and gold price per ounce percentage change, 4/1/1993–4/15/2025.
16 S&P500 is a stock market index that tracks the performance of 500 large corporations in the US.
17 Bloomberg, S&P 500 total return index, gold price per ounce, percentage increase, 4/15/2005–4/15/2025.
18 "75 Years Ago The U.S. Dollar Became The World's Currency. Will That Last?" NPR News, July 2019. https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/07/30/746337868/75-years-ago-the-u-s-dollar-became-the-worlds-currency-will-that-last.
19 Bloomberg, US Federal Reserve balance sheet, European Central Bank balance sheet, Bank of Japan balance sheet, Peoples Bank of China balance sheet percentage growth, 1/1/1999–4/15/2025.
20 Bloomberg, S&P 500 total return; gold price percentage growth,1/1/1999–4/15/2025.
21 ”Conference of Genoa.” Britannica, April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/event/Conference-of-Genoa.
22 ”Bretton Woods and the Birth of the World Bank.” Explore History. World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history/exhibits/Bretton-Woods-and-the-Birth-of-the-World-Bank.
23 ”Nixon Ends Convertibility of U.S. Dollars to Gold and Announces Wage/Price Controls.” Federal Reserve History, August 1971. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold-convertibility-ends.
24 ”Jamaica and the Par-Value System.” Essays in International Finance. Princeton University, March 1977. https://archive.org/details/jamaicaparvalues0000halm/page/n1/mode/2up.
25 The Plaza Accord was an agreement signed by the finance ministers of the G5 nations – the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany and France – on September 22, 1985, at the Plaza Hotel in New York City.
26 The Louvre Accord was an agreement reached in February 1987 between the G6 industrial countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) concerning exchange rates of other currencies against the US dollar. At this meeting the countries agreed ‘to cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels.’
27 ”The euro: the birth of a new currency.” Speeches. European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1999/html/sp990521.en.html.
28 ”IMF Adds Chinese Renminbi to Special Drawing Rights Basket.” IMF News, September 2016. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket.
29 ”China revalues yuan.” CNN Money, July 2005. https://money.cnn.com/2005/07/21/news/international/china_yuan/.
30 ”Swap lines curbed global dollar shortages, appreciation during COVID-19 crisis.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, May 2024. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2024/0521.
31 Bloomberg, ETF industry gold ounces owned 4/15/2025, 10/15/2020 high 111 million, 05/13/2024 80 million low, 2/3/2025–4/15/2025 ounces added.
32 CFTC gold noncommercial contracts net long: 200k current 4/15/2025, max 354k 2/18/2020, min 52k 9/27/2022, five-year average 206k.
33 ”Gold Price Performance & Data.” World Gold Council, April 2025. https://www.gold.org/goldhub/data#price-and-premium.
34 ”Central banks stay bullish on bullion in January.” Gold Focus blog. World Gold Council, March 2025. https://www.gold.org/goldhub/gold-focus/2025/03/central-banks-stay-bullish-bullion-january.
35 "Central banks keep gold in focus in February.” Gold Focus blog. World Gold Council, February 2025. https://www.gold.org/goldhub/gold-focus/2025/04/central-banks-keep-gold-focus-february.
36 Bloomberg, gold price return 12/31/2024–4/15/2025.
37 Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return, 12/31/1969–12/31/1979, 2/22/1987–12/31/1989.

Important information

BROAD COMMODITIES

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PRECIOUS METALS

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Trading in commodities entails a substantial risk of loss and is not suitable for all investors.
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Prospectuses for abrdn Physical Gold Shares ETF, abrdn Physical Palladium Shares ETF, abrdn Physical Platinum Shares ETF, abrdn Physical Precious Metals Basket Shares ETF and abrdn Physical Silver Shares ETF.
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ETF002330 11/30/25
AA-240425-192434-1